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This thesis analyzes Japan’s decision to use Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
(DSMs) in trade agreements. International trade rules are effective when properly
applied: they prevent abrogation of the obligations that come with membership in
international economic organizations. The DSMs are important ways to enforce the
international trade commitments agreed upon by signatory countries. To date, member
countries have filed more than 500 cases through the World Trade Organization (WTO),
effectively enforcing the rules of the largest multilateral trade organization. On the other
hand, in Japan's regional trade agreements (RTAs), none of the DSMs have ever been
invoked despite the presence of many potential disputes. This paper first looks through
the previous literature related to the use/non-use of DSMs. After that it introduces
originally collected data on Japan’s DSMs in trade agreements and analyzes which
variables affect Japan’s decision to initiate a formal dispute settlement process in the
World Trade Organization. It finds that the amount of export, the degree of democracy,
and sectoral characteristics positively affect Japan’s decision of using a DSM. On the
other hand, Japan’s decision to use or join a DSM is negatively affected by RTA with a
disputing country, Southeast Asian category, the number of use times when Japan used

DSMs with that disputing country, and even the disputing country’s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) per capita. The results of analysis implies that the Japan is concerned that
using a DSM may worsen the relations with a disputing country. I suggest multilateral
DSM would be a better option to mitigate Japan’s concerns about using a DSM in its
RTAs.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Both international trade and the legal institutionalization of trade have
increased in the past decades. With the creation of the WTO in 1995, and rapid increase
in RTAs, trade has been institutionalized and legalized to an extent never seen before. 1
One of the strongest indicators of increased legalization are formalized dispute
settlement mechanisms (DSMs), wherein trade disputes can be settled through
third-party, neutral arbiters. If the obligations of trade agreements cannot be enforced
when one of signatories to a trade agreement fails to comply with the obligations, the
practical value of the commitment of trade agreements decreases. Concurrent with the
creation of the WTO, RTAs also began to develop highly formalized DSMs.2 Settling
disputes in a timely and structured manner helps to prevent the detrimental effects of
unresolved international trade conflicts and to mitigate the imbalances between
stronger and weaker players; disputes are settled on the basis of rules rather than
allowing political power to determine the outcome.

1

Hillman, J. (2009). Conflicts between Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements and the
WTO-What Should WTO Do. Cornell Int'l LJ, 42, 193; Mansfield, E. D., & Pevehouse, J. C. (2013). The expansion of
preferential trading arrangements. International Studies Quarterly, 57(3), 592-604; Rosendorff, B. P. (2005). Stability
and rigidity: politics and design of the WTO's dispute settlement procedure. American Political Science Review, 99(03),
389-400; Goldstein, J., & Martin, L. L. (2000). Legalization, trade liberalization, and domestic politics: a cautionary note.
International organization, 54(03), 603-632.
2 Froese, M. D. (2014). Regional Trade Agreements and the Paradox of Dispute Settlement. Manchester Journal of
International Economic Law, 11(3), 367-396.
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In the WTO, as of April 1, 2016, more than 500 cases have been filed.3 However,
the use of most RTA DSMs is very limited.4 As RTAs give signatory states more preferable
trade terms than larger international organizations such as the WTO, the limited use of
RTA DSMs is startling: states are not taking full advantage of the beneficial trade
agreements that they invested considerable resources in negotiating. Limited use of the
RTA DSMs implies a systematic reason why RTA DSMs are not the preferred method to
resolve the conflicts that inevitably rise within international trade. 5 Japan, in fact, has
not used any RTA DSM to resolve a dispute, despite the presence of many potential
cases. This paper seeks to understand this puzzling non-use of the established
institutional mechanisms, asking: Why is the use of the DSM different between the WTO
and the RTA? What factors affect the state’s decision to use the DSM?
Is Legalization Effective?
In order to resolve interstate disputes peacefully, efficacy of legalization of
international system is important. Legally effective DSM removes the uncertainty of
enforcement of international trade agreements. International trade rules can be
effective when they are properly applied, and the highly legalized and institutionalized
DSMs are important ways to enforce obligations committed in the international trade

3

WTO, Chronological list of disputes cases. Available:
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.
4 Chase, C., Yanovich, A., Crawford, J. A., & Ugaz, P. (2013). Mapping of Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms in
Regional Trade Agreements-Innovative or Variations on a Theme?; Jung, Y. S. (2013). Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
and Power Asymmetry in Regional Trade Agreements. Available at SSRN 2346569.
5 One may assume there may be no conflicts or disputes in RTAs. However, as is outlined in great detail in Chapter 4,
there are numerous examples of conflicts within RTAs.
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rules among signatory countries.6 Jo and Namgung mention RTA DSMs “have been
shown to significantly influence the functioning RTAs and are associated with pacifying
and trade-enhancing effects.”7 According to Yarbrough and Yarbrough, in the absence of
an international authority with powers to impose sanction for non-compliance, if an
agreement can automatically impose substantial costs on any party guilty of
noncompliance, the agreement may be feasible.8 A system which allows a third party to
judge and punish noncompliance provides an automatic enforcement mechanism. By
explicitly embodying a credible threat of retaliation or reciprocal action, trade
agreements become self-enforcing.
DSMs are set up in most trade agreements to ensure the agreements can be
enforced and disputes can be settled.9 The WTO indicates on its website that effective
DSMs are important to enforce obligations and commitments undertaken in trade
agreements.10 The European Commission (EC) illustrates the importance of DSMs:
“DSMs provide a rapid and effective means of settling disagreements on whether a
country has acted in conformity with its international obligations. DSMs apply the
agreements, and develop the interpretative understanding of the agreements. By

6

European Commission (“EC”), Dispute Settlement. Available:
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/dispute-settlement/.
7 Jo, H., & Namgung, H. (2012). Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Preferential Trade Agreements Democracy,
Boilerplates, and the Multilateral Trade Regime. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(6), 1041-1068. P.1042; Kono, D. Y.
(2007). Making anarchy work: International legal institutions and trade cooperation. Journal of Politics, 69(3),
746-759.
8 Yarbrough, B. V., & Yarbrough, R. M. (1986). Reciprocity, bilateralism, and economic ‘hostages’: Self-enforcing
agreements in international trade. International Studies Quarterly, 30(1), 7-21.
9 EC, supra note 6.
10 WTO, Introduction to the WTO dispute settlement system. Available:
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s1p1_e.htm.
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preventing retaliation before a dispute settlement procedure has been completed, trade
damaging unilateral action is avoided.”11
Nevertheless, some debate does exist about the effectives of DSMs in trade
agreements. According to Rosendorff, while many scholars have viewed the introduction
of the WTO DSM as highly successful and effective, others disagree.12 Some say the
frequent use of the WTO DSM may be due to increased violations of treaty obligations,
rather than an indicator of institutional effectiveness. Lewis and Bossche,13 and
Kalderimis14 call the WTO DSM “the jewel of crown,” referring to the institution as a
pinnacle of international legalization.
The WTO DSM is particularly an improvement over the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) DSM. The creation of the Appellate Body, adoption of the
reverse consensus rule regarding the adopting the report of a panel and the Appellate
Body, and creation of a procedure by which a Member may suspend concessions against
the unsuccessful party are on improvements in the WTO DSM from the GATT DSM. The
legalized WTO DSM has worked better than the GATT DSM.15 For example, the WTO
DSM ended the de facto veto right of defendants in the GATT DSM.16

11

EC, supra note 6.
Rosendorff, B. P. (2005), supra note 1.
13 Lewis, M. and Bossche, P. (2013). What to do when disagreement strikes? : The Complexity of Dispute Settlement
under Trade Agreements. Trade Agreements at the Crossroads, 9-25.
14 Kaldermis. K, (2013).Exploring the differences between WTO and investment treaty dispute resolution. Trade
Agreements at the Crossroads, 46-65.
15 Ibid.
16 Davis, C. L. (2012). Why adjudicate?: enforcing trade rules in the WTO. Princeton University Press.
12

4

Davey also finds the WTO DSM has generally provided an effective mechanism
through which WTO Members are able to resolve disputes since 1995.17 Davis also
mentions the WTO DSM is quite effective in resolving disputes and shows the WTO DSM
increases the probability of progress to resolve the complaint by one-third and is
correlated with a reduction in the time to removal of the barrier. 18 Iida analyzes the
effectiveness of the WTO DSM with regard to several dimensions.19 According to Iida, in
the 1980s, the United States in particular turned increasingly to unilateral measures
authorized under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 as a solution of international
trade disputes. Iida found the WTO DSM has been most effective in disarming the U.S.
Section 301 compared to the GATT DSM because the U.S. has rarely unilaterally resorted
to Section 301 since the auto talks debates in the WTO DSM in 1995. Iida mentions the
WTO DSM was constructed to fend off unilateralism. Iida also analyzed whether disputes
in the WTO DSM have reached mutually agreeable solutions or if the decisions of the
WTO DSM are implemented. Iida found the scorecard of the WTO DSM is good only in
the first few years between 1995 and 2003, or that the ratio of “resolved” cases were
high only before 1998. Since 1998, the stockpile of pending cases has been increasing in
Iida.20 As of March 1, 2016, a reexamination of Iida’s analysis using WTO case data finds
that among 503 cases, 48.5% cases are “resolved”, 1.8% cases are “ongoing”, “pending”

17

Davey, W. J. (2005). The WTO dispute settlement system: the first ten years. Journal of International Economic Law,
8(1), 17-50.
18 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.
19 Iida, K. (2004). Is WTO Dispute Settlement Effective?. Global Governance, 10(2), 207-225.
20 Ibid.
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cases are 29.6%, “not known” cases are 19.1% and “failed to resolve” cases are 1.0%.21
Figure 1 presents the results and progress of the WTO cases.
50%

48.5%

45%

Number of cases

40%
35%
29.6%

30%
25%

19.1%

20%
15%

10%
5%

1.8%

1.0%

0%
resolved

ongoing

pending

not known

failed to resolve

Figure 1. Results and Progress of Cases in the WTO DSMs22
It is easy to interpret the “resolved” and “failed to resolve” but it is difficult to
evaluate “ongoing”, “pending” and “not known” because some cases in these categories
may be resolved in the future and some may not but no one cannot know the future
result. When comparing only “resolved” cases and “failed to resolve” cases, the WTO
DSM seems to work well.
In the case of the WTO DSM, procedures begin with a complaint stating the
legal basis for the complaint by one or more countries against another, followed by
consultation between the countries, a WTO panel report on the issue, and potentially

21

WTO, Current status of disputes. Available:
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.htm.
22 WTO, Chronological list of disputes cases, supra note 3.
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trade sanctions against one of the countries.23 On the other hand, contents of RTA
DSMs vary across agreements.24 For example, some RTAs have provisions of establishing
standing tribunals or courts, whereas others use ad hoc tribunals for resolving disputes.
Allee and Elsig mention how hundreds of international agreements with DSMs include
various features associated with timely resolutions, selection of panelists, forum choice,
and sanctions.25
Given the general efficacy of the WTO DSM, states have been quick to imitate
the institutional design when negotiating bilateral or regional trade agreements.
According to Froese, there are three reasons why states which are heavily involved in the
WTO DSM may wish to develop similar mechanisms in RTAs. First, DSMs are a statement
of confidence in the RTA. Second, DSMs are a straightforward attempt to protect
WTO-extra and WTO-plus agreements. Third, DSMs are an expression of confidence in
an approach to dispute settlement that privileges judicial independence. 26
Not all RTAs adopt the same institutional structures as the WTO. The process of
RTA DSM can range from diplomatic, power-based forms of resolution, to more judicial,
rules based procedures.27 For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA) DSM includes diplomatic elements and therefore does

23

Black’s Law Dictionary Tenth Edition; Davis, C. L. (2012).
Chase et al, supra note 4.
25 Allee, T., & Elsig, M. (2014). Why do some international institutions contain strong dispute settlement provisions?
New evidence from preferential trade agreements. The Review of International Organizations, 1-32.
26 Froese, M. D. (2014), supra note 2.
27 Lewis, M. and Bossche, P. (2013), supra note 13.
24
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not function as a neutral and professional arbitration mechanism as well as the WTO.28
Some RTAs such as, the India-Nepal Free Trade Agreement (FTA), adopt political
consultations to reduce trade tensions instead of adopting third party adjudication while
others like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have done so.29 RTA
DSMs without a third party adjudication system are susceptible to trade disputes being
decided by political power rather than more neutral trade rules.
There are other alternative explanations for differences in institutional design. Li
found countries belonging to the same RTA tend to have fewer trade conflicts between
themselves.30 Chase et al explain that even after signing an RTA, member states
continue to use not the RTA DSMs but the WTO DSM to resolve disputes.31 Davey
mentions that, for the most part, the formal procedures of RTA DSMs are not used much
except in NAFTA and Mercosur and the WTO DSM seems to be more legitimate and
effective.32 Jung says the relative disuse of a RTA DSM results from the superiority of the
WTO DSM in minimizing inequality across with power asymmetry.33 According to Busch,
a liberal country prefers to use the WTO DSM from the point of forum shopping

28

Puig, G. V., & Tat, L. T. (2015). Problems with the ASEAN Free Trade Area Dispute Settlement Mechanism and
Solutions for the ASEAN Economic Community. Journal of World Trade, 49(2), 277-308.
29 Jo, H., & Namgung, H. (2012), supra note 7.
30 Li, T. (2014). What Affect Trade Disputes?.
31 Chase et al, supra note 4.
WTO Secretariat, "World Trade Report 2011 – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to
Coherence" (WTO, 2011).
32 Davey, W. (2006). Dispute settlement in the WTO and RTAs: A comment. Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO
Legal System, 343-57.
33 Jung, Y. S. (2013), supra note 4.
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considering a merit of making a case law.34 Many scholars found countries prefer using
the WTO DSM to using RTA DSMs. RTA DSMs seem to be inferior to the WTO DSM in
institutional design.
The potential use of a DSM may work to solve a dispute in the negotiation
stages. Once the DSM procedures start, it can be very costly for respondent countries to
effectively litigate the case. As a result, respondent countries might want to avoid going
to the DSM stage and subsequently may cease to violate the rules, making the DSM an
effective deterrent. However, considering the important roles of the RTA DSMs to
enforce obligations, the limited use of the RTA DSMs indicates current RTAs may allow
countries to derogate from trade rules limiting the deterrence effect. Given the
proliferation of RTAs, and continued regionalization of the international economy, the
lack of formal legalization within RTAs is a serious challenge to the international trade
system supported by RTA proliferation.
Japan’s Problems of RTA DSMs
The number of RTAs are increasing around the world. As of February 1, 2016,
625 notifications of RTAs had been received by the GATT/WTO.35 As of March 1, 2016,
fourteen Japanese RTAs have been implemented.36 Despite the increase in RTAs, the

34

Busch, M. L. (2007). Overlapping institutions, forum shopping, and dispute settlement in international trade.
International Organization, 61(04), 735-761.
35 WTO, Regional trade agreements. Available: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.
36 METI, EPA/FTA/Toshi kyotei (EPA/FTA/Investment Treaties). Available:
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/index.html. The rules and procedures of Japanese RTA DSMs are in
Appendix A.
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usage of DSMs in trade agreements has not proportionally increased.37 In particular for
Japan, the country has not formally participated in a RTA dispute settlement procedure
despite the existence of multiple potential disputes of Japan’s RTAs, which are outlined
in the reports of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI)38 and
Japan Machinery Center for Trade and Investment (JMC).39
Japan has faced an Indonesian violation of Japan-Indonesia Economic
Partnership Agreement (JIEPA) regarding the overcharge of import tariffs on Japanese
automobiles since 2014. According to the Japanese news, it seems that Indonesia tries
to protect local companies that collaborate with foreign companies. 40 Japan has held
multiple Minsterial-level meetings with Indonesia to resolve this problem, but it has not
yet been settled.41 Japan has the option to use the JIEPA’s DSM but has not exercised
that right and does not appear to be poised to do so in the future.
The JIEPA was signed in August 20, 2007 and came into effect in 1 July, 2008.
Indonesia reviewed the import tariff rate for certain automobiles imported from Japan
based on the JIEPA in 2012, but Japanese auto makers found the issues with the tariff
rate and informed the Japanese government in January 2013. As Table 1.1 shows, there

37

Chase et al, supra note 4.
METI, Report on Compliance by Major Trading Trade Partners with Trade Agreements - WTO, FTA/EPA, BIT- and
Report on the WTO Inconsistency of Trade Policies by Major Trading Partners. Available:
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/index_report.html.
39 JMC, Issues and Requests for Improvements on Trade and Investment Barriers in 2014. Available:
http://www.jmcti.org/cgibin/main_e.cgi?Kind=Country.
40 Ibid.
41 Mainichishimbun, Jidousha kanzei: EPA hurikoude kyougi nihonnseihuiIndonesia to(Japanese government will have
meeting with Indonesia about the non-implementation of EPA rules of automobile tariffs), 27 May 2015. Available:
http://mainichi.jp/shimen/news/20150527ddm008020053000c.html, [published in Japanese].
38
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are substantial differences in the tariff rate set for automobile import from Japan to
Indonesia and the terms set forth in the JIEPA.
Table 1.1. Tariff Rate Indonesian Domestic Rule and JIEPA
2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

IND rule

30.9%

28.1%

25.3%

22.5%

19.7%

16.9%

14.1%

JIEPA

20.0%

20.0%

20.0%

20.0%

5.0%

5.0%

5.0%

SOURCES: Appendix of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia (No.209/PMK.011/2012)
on Import duty Tariff setting of the JIEPA Appendix of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of
Indonesia (No. 95/PMK.011/2008) on Import duty Tariff setting of the JIEPA; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japanese
government (MOFA), the JIEPA Annex 1 referred to in Chapter 2 Schedules in relation to Article 20.

According to the JIEPA, the tariff rate is supposed to be 20% from 2012 and 5%
from 2016. However, in the Indonesian domestic rule the tariff rate in 2012 is 30.9%,
28.1% in 2013, 25.3% in 2014, 22.5% in 2015, 19.7% in 2016, 16.9% in 2017, and 14.1%
in 2018. Nikkei reports that Japanese automobile companies lost an estimated 2 billion
yen ($19 million) in 2013 due to the overcharge.42 In 2012 the difference between the
Indonesian import tariff rate and JIEPA rate was 10.9% as seen in Table 1.1. The
difference was 8.1% in 2013, 5.3% in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015. Details of the Indonesian
domestic rule and the JIEPA are shown in the Appendix B. As Figure 2 indicates, the tariff
rate of Indonesian domestic rule is higher than the tariff rate of the JIEPA.

42

Nikkei Asia Review, Japan may sue Indonesia for tariff overcharge, February 9, 2014. Available:
http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Japan-may-sue-Indonesia-for-tariff-overcharge,
[published in Japanese].
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Tariff rate made by Indonesia

Tariff rate of JIEPA

Figure 2. Difference of Automobile Tariff Rate between Indonesian Domestic Rule and
JIEPA
It appears that Indonesia is trying to decrease automobile imports from Japan.
According to the Japanese media, the Indonesian government is frustrated about the
increased trade deficit with Japan after the implementation of the JIEPA.

43

Figure 3

plots automobile imports from Japan to Indonesia: they increased rapidly until 2012 and
thereafter, automobile imports from Japan decreased as Indonesian adopted a higher
tariff rate. If that was Indonesian intention in violating the JIEPA tariff rates, it was
apparently quite successful.

43

The Daily Jakarta Shimbun, “Boueki akaji, younin dekinai” EPA minaoshi motomeru kougyoushou soukyokutyou (The
director general of the Ministry of Industry of Indonesia says “We cannot accept a trade deficit.” Indonesia asks for
the review of the JIEPA), 13 January 2015. Available: http://www.jakartashimbun.com/free/detail/22753.html,
[published in Japanese].
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IND Tariff 30.9%
JIEPA 20.0%

Figure 3. Import Value of Motor Vehicles by Japan to Indonesia (Million US$), 2000-201444

In order to resolve the problem, the Japanese government discussed the issue
with Indonesia first at the Trade Ministerial meeting during APEC in Surabaya in April 20
and 21, 2013. The Japanese government and Japanese industry requested that
Indonesia fix the tariff issue in October 2013.45 Japan and Indonesia again agreed to
discuss the review of the JIEPA at the Japan-Indonesia Bilateral summit in Tokyo in
March 23, 2015, and again at the Ministerial meeting of the review of the JIEPA held in
Tokyo in May 27 and 28, 2015. However, this problem has not been resolved yet and
Japan has not formally initiated a dispute settlement procedure based on the JIEPA as of
March 1, 2016, and has no apparent plans to do so. This problem illustrates that instead
44

Statistics Indonesia. Available: http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1048.
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of applying a DSM to the issue, Japan has not even invoked a formal dispute process in
its RTAs even though Japan faces disputes of its RTAs with trading partners.
Outline of Thesis
The purpose of this paper is to analyze Japan’s decision to use a DSM in trade
agreements. I try to find what affects Japan’s decision of joining a DSM in trade
agreements. In this paper, I first look through the previous literature related to the
use/non-use of DSMs in Chapter 2. Previous scholarship has found some theories about
state’s use and joining of DSM. Previous experience as complainants in the WTO DSM,46
forum shopping,47 herd behavior,48 fear of crowds,49 democracy,50 and industrial
difference51 affect the decision of joining disputes, as well as differences in institutional
designs between RTA DSMs and the WTO DSM.52 There are also existing arguments
about power politics and fear of retaliation of the state’s use of DSM.53 My research
adds to the literature analysis about what affects Japan’s decision of using a DSM not
only in the WTO but also in in its RTAs with recent data.
Chapter 3 introduces originally collected data on Japan’s DSMs in trade
agreements and analyzes which variables affect Japan’s decision to join a formal dispute

46

Gomez‐Mera, L., & Molinari, A. (2014). Overlapping institutions, learning, and dispute initiation in regional trade
agreements: evidence from South America. International Studies Quarterly, 58(2), 269-281.
47 Busch, M. L. (2007), supra note 34.
48 Iida, K. (2006). Legalization and Japan: the politics of WTO dispute settlement. Cameron May.
49 Johns, L., & Pelc, K. J. (2016). Fear of Crowds in World Trade Organization Disputes: Why Don’t More Countries
Participate?. The Journal of Politics, 78(1), 000-000. P.289-290.
50 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.
51 Davis, C. L., & Shirato, Y. (2007). Firms, governments, and WTO adjudication: Japan's selection of WTO disputes.
World Politics, 59(02), 274-313.
52 Allee, T., & Elsig, M. (2014), supra note 25.
53 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.

14

settlement process at the WTO using logit model. As well as successfully replicating the
results of existing work, the analysis demonstrates that Japan’s reluctance to use a DSM
is related to the reluctance to sour political relations with a disputing country.
Chapter 4 introduces past WTO cases where Japan was a complainant or a third
party and examines whether Japan could use a RTA DSM to these cases. After that, it
explains how some important explanatory variables affect Japan’ decision of using a
DSM.
Chapter 5 concludes with suggestions for improvement of Japan’s use of RTA
DSMs. The analysis finds Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM when Japan has a RTA
with a disputing country. When Japan has made claims many times to a disputing
country, Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM with the country. The result of analysis
implies Japan concerns using a dispute settlement may worsen the relations with a
disputing country. If Japan thinks using a dispute settlement does not worsen the
relations with a disputing country, Japan will use a DSM more. I suggest a DSM of
multilateral trade agreement would mitigate Japan’s concerns of initiating a DSM.

15

CHAPTER 2
PREVIOUS LITERATURES
As exemplified by the Indonesian automobile case, Japan has not used RTA
DSMs. Regarding Japan’s lack of experience in using the RTA DSM, previous literature
provides some plausible theories as to why countries refrain. This chapter looks through
the previous literature related to the use/non-use of DSMs. Generally, a country uses or
joins a DSM when the benefit of initiating or joining a dispute settlement procedure is
higher than the cost of using or joining the dispute settlement process. Adjudication
raises costs related to administrative burden, legal precedent, and diplomatic stakes that
concern the government.54
In the WTO, however, when exporters have a sufficiently large share of the
market to recoup benefits from improved access, they will use DSMs although exporters
of other countries could free ride on their effort.55 Possible reasons states refrain from
using a dispute settlement procedures are (1) the issue is relatively new and it is in the
stage of consultation, (2) the damage is not so high compared to the cost of an
arbitration or setting a panel, and (3) the possibility of losing an arbitration or a panel.
Previous literature provides empirical evidence for all of these aspects.
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No Experience of Using the DSM in the RTA
Gomez-Mera and Molinari56 indicate that countries with greater experience as
complainants in the WTO are more likely to file complaints in the South American RTAs.
By contrast, the assumption that countries with greater experience as complainants in
the RTA disputes are more likely to file complaints at the regional level was not
statistically significant.57 The past use of RTA DSMs is not statistically correlated with the
future use of RTA DSMs. This analysis indicates that multilateral experience has a
stronger and more consistent effect than regional experience on the use of DSMs in
South American countries.
Davis and Bermeo found that previous regional and the WTO experience, as
either a complainant or respondent, influences the likelihood of initiating a DSM for
developing countries.58 Particularly for developing nations, they found that previous
experience was a key indicator for use of DSMs at the GATT/WTO.59 For developing
countries, the startup costs associated with initiating a DSM can be reduced by learning
how to use a DSM as either a complainant or respondent. 60 The experience increased a
country’s willingness to initiate future disputes in developing countries.
However, the results seen in South American countries and developing
countries cannot directly apply to Japan. Although Japan has been involved with the
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WTO DSM in more than 20 instances, it has never used any of its RTA DSMs. Hutnick
found that a previous regional dispute experience increased the likelihood of initiating a
current regional dispute in a particular subject area in the WTO.61 This literature also
found that the effects of previous experience vary: they are conditioned by a state’s
learning capacity and the amount of previous experience. In the case of Japan, Japan
seems to have learning capacity but Japan has not experienced regional DSMs.
Therefore, it is challenging to verify this result. In summary, literatures on the analysis of
the relation between past experiences of WTO/RTA DSM and future uses of RTA DSM
cannot provide a justified explanation for why Japan has not used any RTA DSM.
Forum Shopping/Legal Precedent
Forum shopping is the practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or
court in which a claim might be heard.62 The theory of forum shopping is applicable to
Japan when disputes are related to same rules of the WTO and RTAs but is not applicable
when disputes are related only to rules of RTAs. Japan’s RTAs include WTO-plus/extra
rules. Forum shopping does not happen when disputes are related to WTO-plus/extra
rules in RTAs.
Busch explains the concept of forum shopping between the RTA and the WTO
DSM and finds that a liberal country choose multilateral forum such as the WTO while
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illiberal countries choose regional forum.63 Davis mentions political lobbying is a key
factor in the selection of institutional forum for trade negotiation. 64 Froese found that
disputes tend to go to the WTO and that proliferation of RTA DSMs has not weakened
the importance of the WTO DSM.65 This finding is in line with Japan’s current situation
of using a DSM. Japan has used the WTO DSM man times but has not used a RTA DSM.
Froese mentions further research is needed to examine the use of RTA DSMs.
Regarding legal precedent, governments may worry about the risk of losing the
ruling, which represents a worse outcome than the status quo because a behavior that
had been questionable before the ruling might be legitimated as case law.66 According
to Busch, a liberal country chooses a multilateral forum such as the WTO because it
wants to not only win the case but also wants to use its case law in the future. On the
other hand, an illiberal country chooses a regional forum because it wants to avoid being
sued by other countries in the future by the case law. Based on his idea, Japan will prefer
a multilateral forum because Japan is a liberal country, and will moreover prefer to
utilize the WTO DSM over the RTA DSMs to resolve disputes.
This analysis is the same direction of Japan’s situation of Indonesian violation of
JIEPA, but the forum shopping concept has limited applicability when there is no overlap
between institutional rules. With respect to Japan’s current nonuse of RTA DSMs, WTO
agreements do not cover the lower tariff rates seen in the RTAs. As the analysis can be
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applied only when a dispute is related to the violation of same rules in the WTO and
RTAs, forum shopping is therefore not a viable approach. Usually some rules are same in
the WTO and RTAs but some rules in RTAs are different from the WTO. Most of RTA rules
are new and higher level than the WTO rules.
Using cases quite similar to Japan’s, Puig and Tat analyzed the use of the ASEAN
Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) DSM.67 Similar to Japan’s, the AFTA DSM has never been
used. Puig and Tat pointed out the overlap of the AFTA DSM with the WTO DSM. In this
point, Japan’s RTAs are different from the AFTA DSM. The AFTA DSM allows member
states to resort to fora outside of AFTA for the settlement of any disputes with other
member states. All ASEAN member states are also members of the WTO. Therefore they
can bring disputes arising from AFTA to either AFTA DSM or the WTO DSM as long as the
disputes are related to similar or same rules of the WTO. On the other hand, Japan’s RTA
DSMs do not allow states to use both the RTA DSM and the other fora at the same. In
their argument, Puig and Tat mention the risk of developing divergent case law between
the AFTA DSM and the WTO DSM because of the overlap of two DSMs. Inconsistencies in
case law bring unpredictability in the future disputes and lead to forum shopping. In the
case of Japan, Japan cannot bring the same issue to the WTO DSM and RTA DSMs at the
same time.
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Herd Behavior/Fear of Crowds
Herd behavior is a behavior that a country follows and files an identical or fairly
similar case against the same defendant country when a major country decides to
litigate a case against another.68 Fear of crowds means the greater the number of other
third parties are, the less likely a country will use a DSM because negotiations become
more complicated as more parties join.
Iida points out that Japan’s activism in the WTO DSM could be interpreted as a herd
behavior.69 In other words, Japan uses the WTO DSM only if other affected countries are
bringing up the same issue. In his article, of the 11 cases in which Japan was a
complainant, ten of them could be considered herd behavior, and only one case could be
considered “independent” behavior. This theory seems to be able to explain Japan’s less
use of RTA DSMs because most of Japan’s RTAs are bilateral.
Johns and Pelc similarly explain state behavior in joining a dispute settlement
process as a third party as “fear of crowds”.70 However, Japan has participated in
disputes as a third party many times. Japan seems not to have fear of crowds about
joining a dispute.
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Democratic or Non-Democratic
There are arguments regarding the relation between democracy and state’s
political behavior. Democracy and legalization are closely connected.71 Some scholars
explain the democracy and the use of DSMs. Fang shows that democratic governments
incur higher noncompliance costs than non-democratic countries.72 Lower cost
non-democratic countries are more likely to use a DSM than higher cost democratic
countries.73 This result seems to be consistent with Japan’s current situation because
Japan is a higher cost democratic country.
According to Davis, democratic states are in favor of using courts to resolve
international disputes. Davis says that there is a positive relationship between
democracy and trade complaints in both the GATT and WTO and that authoritarian
governments brought only ten disputes during the first decade of WTO adjudication.74
Davis also shows that democracies are more likely to file legal complaints.75
Industry Patterns
Davis and Shirato found that difference in industry patterns affected Japan’s
initiation of the WTO DSM by investigating three major industries using the concept of
velocity.76 According to Davis and Shirato, high-velocity industry is an industry which
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faces environments in which there is rapid and discontinuous change in demand,
competitors, technology or regulation. High-velocity industries have many product lines
and face rapid product turnover. Low-velocity business environment are few product
lines and low product turnover. They researched the causal mechanisms in the context
of firm and government decision making of the use of the WTO DSM, finding that
high-velocity industries such as the electronic industry were less likely to initiate a WTO
DSM and low-velocity industries such as iron and steel industry were more likely to use a
WTO DSM. For example, the Japanese electronics firm NEC chose not to ask its
government to challenge U.S. antidumping duties on its supercomputers in the WTO
because it had already moved on with other strategies to improve market share and did
not want to wait for the WTO verdict.77 This analysis may be able to apply to Japan’s
attitude of the use of RTA DSMs.
Institutional Design Issues in Japan’s RTA
Regarding the institutional design problems of the DSMs in Japan’s RTA DSMs,
Davey’s focus on institutional legitimacy is noteworthy.78 He mentions that the WTO
DSM is superior to the NAFTA DSM in systematic points such as the time period of
procedures, how to choose panelists, monitoring system of implementation of the
decisions, and the assistance of trained experts provided by the WTO secretariat to WTO
panelists and Appellate Body members. He additionally points out a case in which the
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U.S. did not comply with the decision of the NAFTA DSM. A second problem with the
NAFTA DSM is that there is no agreement on the identity of the panelists. According to
Article 2009 of Chapter 20 in the NAFTA, the roster of the NAFTA DSM panelists is
supposed to be appointed by consensus of member countries but the NAFTA member
countries have not found consensus on the makeup of the roster.79 Therefore, the roster
for the DSM of the NAFTA Chapter 20 has yet been made public. 80 Different from NAFTA
Chapter 20, the roster of the DSM based on the NAFTA Chapter 19 has been made public
because the DSM based on NAFTA Chapter 19 does not require consensus to make the
roster.81
The DSMs in the WTO are used more than the RTAs because of its greater
legitimacy.82 In the WTO, panelists are neutral - different from the US-Canada FTA - and
the WTO is less power-based and more rule-based than RTA DSMs. In the NAFTA DSM,
Mexico has encountered some difficulties in obtaining compliance from the U.S. 83 Davey
mentions that many US-Mexican and US-Canadian disputes were brought to the WTO
instead of the NAFTA DSM in the same period. He concludes the principal system for
resolving these disputes is the WTO DSM, not the NAFTA DSM for NAFTA countries.
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These points seem suggestive to improvement of Japan’s RTAs. Davey’s analysis
can apply to current Japan’s less use of RTA DSMs because Japan’s RTA DSMs lack four
key features of the WTO DSM: time period of consultation, automatic operation, neutral
experts and the rules for monitoring the implementation. Japan can improve these
points regarding its RTA DSMs.
According to Ahn, there are some structural drawbacks in RTA DSMs in their
implementation stages.84 In the case of retaliation by a complaining country, the party is
allowed to raise RTA tariffs only up to the WTO Most Favored Nations Treatment (MFN)
level. WTO member countries cannot raise their RTA tariff rates more than the WTO
MFN level. Ahn mentions this makes the utility of RTA DSMs significantly reduced and
therefore the complaining country will prefer the WTO DSM. Therefore any overlapping areas
or legal issues among the WTO and RTAs are more likely to be addressed by the WTO DSM.

Ahn also points out some systematic institutional problems within Asian RTA
DSMs.85 For example, other than the AFTA Asian RTA DSMs do not have an appeal
system or a secretariat to support dispute settlement procedures unlike the WTO DSM.
The scope of DSMs is different among RTA DSMs and the WTO DSM. For example,
monetary payment for setting disputes is allowed in the Korea-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement KORUS DSM but not in the WTO DSM. In the KORUS, the complaining party
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may not suspend benefits if the responding party provides written notice to the
complaining party that it will pay an annual monetary assessment. 86
Regarding Ahn’s points, Japan’s RTA DSMs don’t have an appeal system and the
secretariat. The scope of Japan’s RTAs is different from the WTO DSMs. For example,
Japan-Malaysia EPA DSM does not apply to Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).87 Japan’s RTA DSMs don’t have a system
using monetary payment for settling disputes like KORUS.
Zangl et al analyze the effectiveness of international dispute settlement system
from the points of three different ideas.88 Realists assert that international law does not
work without global authority. In the real world, the implementation of international law
depends on the relation of power politics. In this position, considering the current world
which does not have the world government over countries, the international legal
system does not work. Rosendoff mentions the WTO has no enforcement powers, no
jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets, no truncheons, and no teargas to induce
compliance in contrast with national law.89 Actually, there are some non-implemented
cases in past WTO disputes. Between 1995 and 2000 in the WTO disputes, six out of 32
cases were not implemented.90 Of these six cases, the U.S. was a respondent in four,
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consistent with the realist critique.91 If Japan does not use a DSM because of fearing of
large power, this idea can apply to Japan’ behavior of nonuse of RTA DSMs.
Second, institutionalists think states comply with international legal norm
because following the international rules keeps their good reputation as a law-abiding
member of the international community. If this is true, Japan can use a DSM with
expectation that a respondent country will follow the decision of a panel or arbitration.
Third, liberalists think international law can be effective only among democratic states.
Japan may think democratic countries will abide by international rules and decisions by a
panel or arbitration and may prefer to use its DSMs to democratic countries because non
democratic countries may not follow the result of a panel or an arbitration. By applying
these ideas to classification of explanatory variables, I can know which position can
explain Japan’s decision of joining a dispute settlement process in the trade agreements.
According to Davis, trade disputes may arise through either a failure of implementation
in which exporters never gained the promised market access or through a new barrier
that has been imposed in response to changed economic or political conditions. 92 Davis
mentions low levels of liberalization would be less likely to lead to widespread cheating
since compliance is easy, and as a result enforcement would rarely be a problem. On the
other hand, deep liberalization commitments are more likely to give rise to incentives for
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cheating and encounter serious enforcement challenges.93 If Japan’s RTAs are low level
of liberalization, this theory may apply to Japan’s nonuse of RTA DSM. However, Japan
faces potential violations of its RTAs by other signatory countries. It cannot say Japan’s
RTAs are low level of liberalization.
Table 2.1 shows the institutional differences of DSMs. The JIEPA does not have
the appeal system, the Dispute Settlement Body, secretariat and third party system in its
RTA DSMs different from the WTO DSM. Details of DSMs of the WTO and the JIEPA are
shown in Appendix B.
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Table 2.1. Institutional Differences of DSM: JIEPA versus the WTO
JIEPA

WTO

Members

2

162 as of April 8, 2016

Secretariat

×

○

Dispute Settlement body
(DSB)

×

○

List of panelists or

×

○

By the Parties in equal shares

From the WTO budget

Procedures for multiple
complaints

×

○

Past cases

0

505 as of March 30, 2016

Third parties

×

○

Venue

Decided by mutual consent of the
Parties, failing which it shall
alternate between the Parties.(Art.
144.2)
×

WTO building (as a practice)

arbitrators
Expense of panelists or
arbitrators

Appellate Body

○

Surveillance of
×
○
implementation of
recommendations and
rulings
SOURCES: MOFA, the JIEPA; WTO, Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, Understanding on rules and
procedures governing the settlement of disputes; WTO, Chronological list of disputes cases.
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Asian Characteristic/Japan’s Political Context
There may be other probable reasons why Japan does not use RTA DSMs. For
example, the assumption that Asian countries like Japan do not like to use an
arbitration or a court to resolve disputes. For example, Davey mentions ASEAN
countries are possibly more comfortable with negotiating compromises to resolve
disputes.94 However, this idea is not necessarily true in the case of Japan since Japan
has already used many WTO DSMs in the past. Allee and Elsig additionally cast doubt
on assertion that “Asian culture” is not amenable to formal dispute settlement from
their research because they discover that Asian RTAs contain stronger dispute
settlement rules, as do agreements among Americas.95 Davey also stated that ASEAN
countries have occasionally used the WTO system, even against each other. According
to Puig and Tat,96 as same as Japan’s RTA DSMs, the AFTA DSM has never been used.
Puig and Tat pointed out three problems of AFTA DSM. First is the overlap of the AFTA
DSM with the WTO DSM. Second is the lack of standing of private parties under the
AFTA DSM. Thirdly, Puig and Tat identified the imperfection of rules of law regarding
AFTA DSM. Therefore the idea that Asian countries prefer negotiation to DSM for
solving disputes is not universally true.97
Regarding Japan’s political context, Davis mentions the Japanese legislature
grants considerable autonomy to the bureaucracy for management of foreign trade

94
95
96
97

Chapter 14 Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs, supra note 78.
Allee, T., & Elsig, M. (2014), supra note 25.
Puig, G. V., & Tat, L. T. (2015), supra note 28.
Puig, G. V., & Tat, L. T. (2015), supra note 28.

30

policy. As a result, there should be lower demand for adjudication and less
politicization of case selection for WTO disputes, because of the relative absence of
political pressure on foreign economic policy in Japan.98 When filing complaints,
bureaucrats and industry take the lead with little interest from the legislature. Whereas
U.S. officials face pressure to get tough with China, Japan has been able to pursue
patient negotiations without the need to resort to adjudication to satisfy domestic
demands. According to Davis, Japan follows a more selective adjudication strategy and
initiates only a few cases for large industries with less obvious political influence on
selection.99
Concern for Retaliation/Bargaining Power/ Tit for Tat Filing
One of the plausible reasons behind Japan’s reluctance to use the DSM to
address Indonesian’s violation of the EPA may be the concern of retaliation. The
consequences of such retaliation may include restricting visas or interrupted investment
activities. The cost of the DSM is also one of the concerns but the reprisal is deemed to
have higher detrimental effect to Japanese industry. Davis and Shirato echoed the same
points, reporting that how Japanese industries expressed the concern that China would
view a complaint as a hostile act and retaliate through other policies that could be
harmful for business regarding the use of the WTO DSM to China.100 Davis mentions
governments may fear that challenging a trade partner’s barrier would be linked to

98

Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.
Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.
100 Davis, C. L., & Shirato, Y. (2007), supra note 51.
99

31

other economic policies, whether by countersuits in WTO adjudication or in other policy
areas.101 The foreign government could easily adopt small measures that may worsen
the business environment for exporters or investors related to the dispute or those in
completely different economic sectors without engaging in actual violation of trade
rules.102
In the analysis of Gent and Stephen,103 bargaining power plays important role
in the decision to pursue arbitration or adjudication. States with greater relative
bargaining power will be reluctant to give up decision control to an arbitral panel or
international court unless they expect to receive a favorable ruling because they can get
better results in bilateral negotiations. Bargaining power is relative and many potential
components affect the bargaining power of bilateral relations.
According to Davey suspension of concessions has been authorized and used
only four times in the WTO DSM.104 Davey mentions there is a general problem with
suspension of concessions. It seems to work when threatened by a large country against
a small country and has worked when implemented by one major power against another
but it may not be effective remedy for a small country. On the other hand, Jung argues
that a weaker state has less flexibility in a RTA DSM than the WTO DSM.105 The WTO
DSM is more efficient and sophisticated to deal with trade dispute among member
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countries by minimizing inequality across countries with power asymmetry. The more
frequent use of the WTO DSM than the RTA DSMs might be of this reason.
Davis and Bermeo mention the idea of tit for tat filing, or the use of
countersuits by respondents such as disputes between the U.S. and EC in the past WTO
cases, in the use of DSMs in trade agreements.106 Guzman and Simmons found this
behavior did not have a significant effect on defendant selection in WTO disputes.107
Analysis of Determinants of Participation in WTO DSM
Bown analyzed the determinants of participation of all members of the WTO in
the WTO DSMs in period between 1995 and 2000.108 His analysis shows export
country’s trade retaliatory capacity, legal capacity and international political relations
affect the country’s decision of using the WTO DSM. This analysis can apply to current
Japan’s use of RTA DSMs.
As seen above, some arguments in previous literatures may be applicable to
explain Japan’s decision of using the WTO DSM but there is no analysis which analyzes
Japan’s decision of using a RTA DSM. Based on the related previous literatures, I analyze
what affects Japan’s decision of using a DSM not only in the WTO but also in its RTAs in
next chapter with recent data not utilized by other scholars. My analysis uses the data
between 1995 and 2015 and the data comprise of the past WTO cases and potential
disputes which might violate the rules of the WTO or Japan’s RTAs.
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS
Data of Japan’s RTA DSMs
In this chapter, I systematically analyze Japan’s use of the dispute settlement
mechanism. Before the analysis, I present data from the WTO regarding Japan’s
disputes.109 Figures 4 to 6 show the data when Japan was a complainant in the WTO
disputes. As seen in Figure 4, Japan won the 66% of total cases in the WTO disputes
when Japan was a complainant. Figure 5 shows the rules used in the WTO disputes when
Japan was a complainant, GATT is most frequently used and followed by Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), Subsidies, Anti-dumping, Marrakesh
Agreement, and Safeguards. Figure 6 shows the classification of industries in cases of the
WTO when Japan was a complainant. Automobile including tire industry, and iron and
steel dominate more than half. These two industries plus Electric and Electronic industry,
and Energy and natural resources industry cover more than 75%. The result reflects the
interests of Japanese export industries.
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Panel lapsed
5%
Mutually agreed solution
5%

Panel established, but not yet
composed…

Panel composed
5%
Lost
5%

In consultations
9%
Won
66%

Total 21

Figure 4. Result of Disputes in the WTO when Japan was a Complainant
Import
Licensing
2%
GATS
GP
2%
2%

Protocol TBT
2%
2%

SPS
2%

DSU
2% Safeguards
5%

GATT
36%

WTO
9%

Anti-dumping
10%

Subsidies
12%

Total 36

TRIMS
14%

Figure 5. Classification of Rules used in Disputes in the WTO when Japan was a
Complainant
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Figure 6. Classification of Industries in Disputes in the WTO when Japan was a
Complainant
Figure 7 to 9 show the data when Japan was a third party in the WTO disputes.
As seen in Figure 7, when Japan was a third party, they won 60% of cases and 8% of
cases had mutually agreed solutions. Figure 8 shows the classification of rules used in
disputes in the WTO when Japan was a third party. When Japan is a third-party, GATT is
the most frequently used, Anti-dumping is the second, followed by Subsidies, Marrakesh
Agreement, Agriculture, and Protocol of Accession. Figure 9 shows the classification of
industries in disputes in the WTO when Japan was a third party. Manufacturing
industries, Food and Agriculture industries cover more than half. The reason why the

36

food and agriculture are high when Japan is a third party third-party may be from the
point of defense in order to prepare for future disputes as a respondent.

Panel lapsed
3%
Lost
Panel established 6%
but not yet
composed
8%

Others
4%

Mutually agreed
solution
8%
Won
60%
Panel composed
11%

Total 157

Figure 7. Result of Disputes in the WTO when Japan was a Third Party
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Figure 8. Classification of Rules used in Disputes in the WTO when Japan was a Third
Party
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Figure 9. Classification of Industries in Disputes in the WTO when Japan was a Third
Party

Logit Analysis
As seen in Chapter 1, the Indonesian EPA automobile case is a potential Japan’s
RTA violation. In addition, there must be other potential disputes regarding Japan’s RTAs.
In this chapter I systematically analyze which factors affect Japan’s decision to participate
in a dispute settlement procedure when Japan faces potential disputes. A
methodological challenge in this project is determining the sample of potential DSM
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cases. In order to determine potential, but not pursued, cases I coded disputes listed in
the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry reports.110
According to the METI reports,111 while there are more than 200 potential
disputes regarding the WTO and Japan’s RTAs Japan has been a claimant in only 21 cases
in the WTO and has participated in DSMs as a third party in 157 cases. In addition, Japan
has never used any of its RTA DSMs. Following Bown’s approach, but using an updated
dataset, my research is able to take into account post-2000 changes in the global
political economy such as China’s 2001 accession to the WTO. Needless to say, China is a
most important trade partner for Japan and the countries have many trade disputes.
Further, after 2000, Japan has negotiated RTAs with important trading partners such as
countries in Southeast Asia. In addition, not only BRICs but also many Southeast Asian
countries have developed rapidly after 2000. With these changes in the global economy,
the trade conflicts and disputes among these countries and Japan have increased. I need
to consider these changes to analyze Japan’s decision of using a RTA DSM. In addition,
Bown’s data include developing countries but Japan is a developed country with higher
legal capacity, which means the result of Bown cannot necessarily apply directly to
Japan’s specific behavior. This chapter analyzes determinants of Japan’s decision of
participating a DSM in the WTO and RTAs using data from 1995 to 2015 referring to the
method of Bown and other relevant literature.
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Hypothesis of the analysis is that Japan is less likely to use or join a formal
dispute settlement process when Japan thinks using a DSM worsens the relationship
with a disputing country. I hypothesize explanatory variables related to political
economic cost will negatively affect Japan’s decision of using a DSM. The higher the
political economic related variables are, the less likely Japan advocates a DSM in trade
agreements.
Dependent Variable
As a dependent variable, I use potential disputes. The dependent variable has
two categories: participation (Y = 1) where Japan has formally participated as a
complainant or a third party in disputes of the WTO or Japan’s RTAs; non-participation (Y
=0) where Japan did not formally participate in dispute settlement procedure in the
WTO or Japan’s RTAs. The data are from the annual METI reports,112 the report of the
JMC113 and the WTO website.114 The METI and JMC reports include not only cases
which are brought to the WTO but also potential disputes which Japan think violate rules
of the WTO or Japan’s RTAs. Table 3.1 provides a descriptive summary of the variables.
Data obtained from these sources cover cases in the WTO and potential
disputes in the WTO and Japan’s RTAs between 1995 and 2015. There are 21 cases
where Japan became a complainant in the WTO, although not all of cases have
established a panel or are resolved. There are 157 cases where Japan joined the WTO

112
113
114

METI, supra note 38.
JMC, supra note 39.
WTO, Chronological list of disputes cases, supra note 3.

41

disputes as a third party. These 21 cases plus 157 cases are counted as participation (Y =
1) in the analysis.
On the other hand, there are 108 cases which may potentially violate rules of
the WTO or Japan’s RTAs but Japan has not formally initiated the dispute settlement
process. These 108 cases are counted as non-participation (Y =0).
In the WTO, if a member country starts a dispute settlement procedure against
other country, Japan can join the dispute as a third party without becoming a
complainant. Because of the MFN rules of the WTO, if another country made a claim of
the dispute to the WTO and wins the case, Japan can take the benefit of the result of the
dispute. If Country A win the cases against Country B, country B must stop the measure
violating the rules of the WTO. When Japan has incurred damage by the measure of the
country B, if another country like country A wins the DSM, Japan can gain benefits of the
result of the DSM without becoming a complainant. In the use of the WTO DSM, this
type of free riding is not uncommon.115 Third-party participation is cheap but valuable:
it allows countries to guard their interests during negotiations and to voice their views
during litigation, without paying the cost of initiating a DSM and becoming a
complainant.116 States can extract private benefits from settlements and voice their
interests by participating as a third party. However, the greater the number of other
third parties, the less likely a given country is to join because negotiations are more
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complicated as more parties join, which lowers the likelihood of early settlement.117
Nevertheless, Japan’s participation as a third party is high. Japan seems to highly
evaluate the benefit from joining as a third party compared to the risk of delayed
settlement. Therefore, not only non-participation in a dispute but also joining as a third
party is a behavior of free rider. Different from the WTO, Japan cannot freely ride on
disputes as a third party in its bilateral RTAs.
Considering the characteristics of a free rider in the use of the WTO disputes,
Japan does not have to join the disputes as a third party. Japan can take advantage of
the result of other countries’ DSM without joining as a third party. Japan might have
been interested in the some WTO cases where Japan did not join as a third party.
However, it is difficult to know which cases Japan was interested in but did not join as a
third party. Considering the fact that Japan joined 157 cases as a third party, cases in
which Japan participated as a third party were important and related to Japan’s trade
interest. It is considerable that cases which Japan did not join as a third party were not
important to Japan. Therefore, this analysis classifies Japan’s participation in the DSM as
a third party into participation (Y =1) which means Japan has interest in these cases.
Explanatory Variables
Based on the results of previous literatures, this chapter analyzes the likelihood
of Japan’s initiation of a dispute settlement procedure using a measurements of political
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economic costs, expected benefits of formal participation of a dispute settlement
procedure, the likelihood of success in a dispute, and effects of sector difference.
As explanatory variables, I consider four categories, with twelve variables that
may affect the Japan’s decision of using or joining a DSM as a complainant or a third
party. Table 3.1 shows the summary of statistics for variables with author’s predictions.
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Used in the Logit Model
Varibale
- Dependent variable

Predicted Sign

0 = nonpaticipant
1 = interested third party
or complainant
- Explanatory variables
Category 1 : Political
Economic Costs

(for= 0 or 1)

SD

Minimum Maximum

0.622

0.486

0

1

-

0.143

0.351

0

1

-

0.126

0.332

0

1

Unknown

0.476

0.500

0

1

Unknown

0.570

0.496

0

1

5. The number of Japan’s
claim to a disputing country
(NM DSM USE)

Unknown

2.304

2.984

0

8

6. Log GDP per capita of a
disputing country in t-1
(GDP PER)

-

4.107

0.531

3

5

+

0.127

0.101

0.000

0.307

-

12.510

0.691

10

13

+

7.353

3.659

0

10

10. The share of the disputing
country's total exports to
Japan in t-1
(EXP TO JP)

+

0.068

0.045

0.0024

0.2706

11. The amount of ODA from
Japan to a disputing country
in t -1
(AID)

+

0.942

0.351

0.0000

3.5700

-

0.070

0.086

0.0005

0.3410

1. Whether Japan has a
regional trade agreement
with a disputing country
(RTA WITH)
2. Whether a dispute country
is South East Asia
(SEA)
3. Whether Japan became a
respondent claimed by a
disputing country
(TIT FOR TAT)
4. Whether Japan has made a
claim to a disputing party.
(DSM USE)

Category 2: Expected Benefits 7. Japan's exports sent to a
of Formal Participation
disputing country as a share
of Japan's total exports in t -1
(EXPORT)
8. Log GDP of a disputing
country in t-1
(GDP)
Category 3 : The likelihood of 9. The degree of democracy
Success in a Dispute
of a disputing country
(DEMO)

Category 4: Sector effects

Mean

12.Velocity
(VELOCITY)
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Category 1: Political Economic Costs
1. Whether Japan has a preferential trade agreement with a disputing country (RTA
WITH)
The RTA WITH is a measurement of political economy costs: Japan may not
want to formally participate in a DSM against a member of Japan’s RTAs because it
would worsen relations with the country. Having RTA with countries shows that Japan
has good relationship with these countries. Making RTAs requires a lot of efforts for
negotiating countries. For example, Japan has negotiated a RTA with Australia for 7 years.
The purpose making RTA is to strengthen the economic relationship with a country.
Japan’s RTAs include DSMs but using a DSM should not threaten relationship with a
trading partner. Japan has made RTAs with a lot of Southeast Asian countries where
many Japanese companies trade and invest. Stable political relations among countries
are desirable for business. I predict Japan does not use a DSM to countries when Japan
has its RTAs with these countries, which is in line with the result of Bown.118
2. Whether a dispute country is in Southeast Asia (SEA)
RTA WITH is mostly related to Southeast Asian countries because more than half
of Japan’s RTAs are with ASEAN countries. I use a dummy variable of SEA to see the
effect of Southeast Asian countries. As of April 15, 2016, among 14 Japan’s RTAs which
have entered into,119 8 RTAs are with Southeast Asian countries. I predict the
explanatory variable RTA WITH and SEA would have similar result. If the RTA WITH
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Bown, C. P. (2005), supra note 108.
METI, EPA/FTA/Toshi kyotei (EPA/FTA/Investment Treaties), supra note 36.

46

negatively affects Japan’s decision of using or joining a DSM, SEA will also negatively
affect Japan’s decision. Southeast Asia is politically and economically important for Japan
especially considering the emergence of China. The relation between Japan and
Southeast Asia is going well.120 Japan may not want to bring conflicts with Southeast
Asian countries. I predict that Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM with Southeast
Asian countries in order to prevent the possibility of economic disputes disrupting their
deepening diplomatic ties.
3. Whether Japan became a respondent in past disputes of the WTO with the disputing
trade partner (TIT FOR TAT)
This possible variable which may affect the Japan’s decision of joining a DSM
shows the economic conflicting relation between Japan and a disputing country. As
Davis and Bermeo mention, this variable can test whether Japan behaved as tit for tat
filing in the use of DSMs in trade agreements.121 If the result is positive, this variable
might show Japan’s retaliatory attitude against a disputing country about past legal
action to Japan. For example, the European Union (EU)’s claim against the U.S. over the
foreign corporations is seen as retaliation to the U.S. past two claims against EU.122,123
4. Whether Japan made a claim at least one time to a disputing country in the WTO
(DSM USE)
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This variable shows Japan’s past experience to make a claim to a disputing
country. If the result is positive, Japan tends to use or join a DSM to some specific
countries more frequently than to other countries. Japan may think it is easy to make a
claim or join the dispute as a third party to the specific country more than other
countries from the point of political cost. Japan may think joining a dispute does not
worsen the relation with these countries. If the result is negative, Japan may not want to
formally participate in a DSM against some specific countries again. Japan may think
joining a dispute worsens the relation with countries. The data are from the webpage of
the WTO.124
5. The number of Japan’s claim to a disputing country (NM DSM USE)
This variable can show whether Japan tends to make a claim or join a dispute as
a third party to specific countries. Japan may think it is easy to make a claim or join the
dispute as a third party to specific countries more than other countries from the point of
political cost. Japan may think joining a dispute does not worsen the relation with these
countries. If the result is negative, Japan tends not to participate in a DSM again. Japan
may think joining a dispute frequently to same countries worsens the relation with these
countries.
6. Log GDP per capita of a disputing country in t-1 (GDP PER)
Some scholars such as Kim use a Log GDP per capita as a variable of legal
capacity but at the same there are some discussions of the appropriateness of using this
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variable as a measurement of legal capacity.125 For example, Busch et al question of
using log GDP per capita as a measurement of legal capacity.126 Considering the
discussion, I use this variable as an economic measurement of country’s development,
rather than making conclusions about a country’s legal capacity. Although some
countries such as China and India have large GDP as a country but GDP per capita of
these countries are low. Some small countries and jurisdictions such as Singapore and
Hong Kong show high GDP per capita although their GDP is small. GDP per capita may
positively affect Japan’s decision of joining a dispute differently from GDP, which means
Japan prefers to use a DSM to developed countries or negatively affect Japan’s decision
of joining a dispute settlement procedure. These data are from the World Bank127 and
the Taiwan’s National statistics.128 In the analysis of Kim129, this variable was negative
regarding imposition of antidumping duties (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD) and
also negative in his 2 models regarding initiation of a request for consultation to AD/CVD.
I predict Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM to a developed country because Japan
may think the disputes would be solved by negotiation with developed country. Japan
may think developed countries are more likely to respect the result of negotiation
although it is not legally binding. On the other hand, Japan may think developing
countries are more likely to overturn the non-binding result of negotiation, or that it is
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not easy to negotiate with developing countries because of their weak governance
capacity. Developing countries also may not negotiate the issue sincerely without a
formal compulsory dispute settlement process. For example, Venezuela tried to dismiss
the award of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. 130 If
there is no legal binding dispute settlement system, countries like Venezuela may not
negotiate to resolve disputes. Therefore Japan may think a legally binding DSM is
preferable for resolving disputes with developing countries, whereas the country does
not need to resort to a DSM to resolve disputes with developed countries.
Category 2: Expected Benefits of Formal Participation
7. Japan’s exports sent to a disputing country as a share of Japan’s total exports in t -1
(EXPORT)
A variable of Japan’s exports sent to the disputing country as a share of Japan’s
total exports in year t -1 (EXPORT) is a measurement of the importance of the disputing
country is as export market. Following Bown,131 I use the year before the initiation of
the DSM. If the result of the analysis is positive, Japan tends to join the DSM as a
complainant or a third party to the country to which Japan exports a lot. The data are
from the Ministry of Finance of Japanese government (MOF).132 I predict EXPORT will
have a positive effect on DSM initiation. It is natural to think that Japan formally initiate
a dispute settlement process against a country to which Japan exports a lot. The amount
130

Business Wire, Gold Reserve Reports U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Enters Judgment against
Venezuela in Excess of $760 Million; Denies Motion to Stay Enforcement. Available:
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151123005971/en/Gold-Reserve-Reports-U.S.-District-Court-District.
131 Bown, C. P. (2005), supra note 108.
132 MOF, Boueki toukei (Trade Statistics of Japan). Available: http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/suii/html/time.htm.

50

of damage from the violation of trade agreements is high when the amount of export
from Japan is large. Japan’s expected benefit from the winning of DSM is higher than the
cost of DSM when EXPORT is high.
8. Log GDP of disputing country in year t-1 (GDP)
The GDP of a disputing country is a measurement of the size of economy of a
disputing country. As Davis and Shirato mention, larger markets offer more economic
opportunities for Japan’s industry but at the same time larger markets may have more
bargaining power.133 Japan may be more active or less active to participate in a dispute
settlement process against a large economy considering the size of economy. This
variable is related to the idea of realism. If Japan does not want to make a claim to a
larger economy, it may suggest Japan’s behavior is close to realism position. The data are
from the World Bank134 and Taiwan’s National statistics.135 In the analysis of Davis and
Shirato, this variable was not statistically significant but the coefficient was negative
regarding a Japan’s initiation of a WTO DSM. Considering the result, I predict negative to
this variable.
Category 3: The Likelihood of Success in a Dispute
9. The degree of democracy of a disputing country (DEMO)
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According to the analysis of countries’ behaviors in international dispute
settlement by Zangl et al,136 it can be said the higher democratic ratio in the
international organization would contribute to the higher level of judicialization. The
declaration of United Nation also says “We reaffirm that human rights, the rule of law
and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing…”137 Davis additionally
mentions “the close connection between democracy and judicial institutions within a
state is widely recognized.”138 In this analysis, I use a degree of democracy as variable
for a measurement of the rule of law in a disputing country. According to Fang, 139
democratic governments incur higher noncompliance costs than their non-democratic
states due to their exposure to domestic sources of noncompliance costs that
non-democracies are not subject to. Domestic interests groups and free media in a
democracy play a significant role in publicizing a government’s failure in working with
international institutions.
Japan may expect higher democratic countries will more follow the results of
disputes because these countries respect the rule of law. This variable is related to the
idea of liberalism. If the result is positive, Japan tends to initiate a DSM to democratic
countries which is in line with the concept of liberalism.140 The data are from the Polity

136

Zangl,et al, supra note 88.
United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/67/1, Declaration of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on
the rule of law at the national and international levels, Para 5. Available:
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/1.
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IV, a standard measure of democracy used in the literature.141 The data of Hong Kong
and the EU are missing in the data of Polity IV, and I used the variable mean for Hong
Kong and used the average democracy of the EU member countries for the the EU. In
the analysis of Kim142, this variable is positive regarding imposition of AD and CVD in his
2 models and also positive in initiation of a request for consultation to AD/CVD.
10. The share of the disputing country’s total exports to Japan in t-1 (EXP TO JP)
Disputing country’s exports sent to Japan as a share of disputing country’s total
exports in year t -1 means the Japan’s trade retaliation capacity to the disputing country
according to Bown.143 This variable is a measurement of trade retaliation capacity of
Japan and related to the idea of realism. Due to the self-enforcing nature of the WTO
and RTA DSMs, exporting countries can enforce their rights only through actual or
implicit threats of retaliation against trading partners. As an enforcement tool, Japan
may increase the import tariff rates from the disputing country if the disputing country
does not follow the decision of the DSM. Japan may be more likely to participate in a
DSM when this variable is high. The data are from the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the EC.144 In the analysis of Bown145, this
variable is positive regarding likelihoods of becoming a complainant or a third party.
11. The amount of ODA from Japan to a disputing country in t -1 (AID)
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Japan gives official development assistance (ODA) to developing countries. The
amount of ODA in year t-1 is also a measurement of trade retaliation capacity of
exporter to a disputing country.146 Japan can decrease or stop ODA to disputing
countries as an enforcement tool if they don’t follow the result of the DSM. Japan may
be more likely to participate in a DSM when this variable is high. These data are from the
MOFA.147 In his analysis Bown finds that the recipient of bilateral aid received from
exporter was negative. Japan will not use or join a DSM when AID is high.148
Category 4: Sector Effects
12. Velocity (VELOCITY)
Davis and Shirato149 analyze how industry patterns affect the initiation of the
WTO DSM. The analysis is also an important reference. Davis and Shirato used the
Research and Development (R&D) ratio to total sale or production as the velocity to
measure which may affect the probability of dispute initiation. Davis and Shirato
explained the difference of velocity among industries. That is, higher velocity industries
such as electronics industries are less likely to use the DSM but lower velocity industries
such as iron and steel industries are more likely to use the DSM. In order to examine the
affection of industrial difference to the Japanese DSM initiation, this thesis uses the R&D
ratio to total value added of each industry as an explanatory variable. The R&D ratio to
total value added means total R&D expenditures over the total value added in a year
146
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measured by current prices as a velocity of industry. This variable is used to measure the
stability of a business environment, degree of technological instability, and
innovativeness.150
The data of R&D expenditures and the data of value added of each industry in
Japan are from the OECD.151 I used 2008 data because 2008 data is most recent
available in the OECD database regarding Japan. In the analysis of Davis and Shirato,
total production is used but the OECD data do not show the total production of services,
I used the value added instead to include service industries in the analysis. According to
Davis and Shirato,152 the result is negative. For example, high velocity industries such as
electronic industry are less likely to use a DSM but low velocity industries such as iron
and steel industry are more likely to use a DSM. High velocity sectors are as follows.
Chemical industry is 34.1%. Electric and electronic industry is 23%. Automobile industry
is 17.8%. Manufacturing is 11.5%.
I examine this variable in this analysis with data from the WTO153 and the METI
and JMC report.154 In the analysis of Davis and Shirato, this variable is negative
regarding a Japan’s initiation of a WTO dispute.
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Analysis
In the analysis, I use a logit model appropriate to the categorical nature of the
dependent variable. In model 1, I use all of 12 explanatory variables. In the model 2, in
order to check whether these variables are good to fit our model, I use the likelihood
ratio test. As the result of the likelihood ratio tests, seven variables are fit to the model. I
use these seven explanatory variables in model 2. In model 3, I replace RTA WITH by SEA
because more than half of Japan’s RTAs consist of Southeast Asian countries. The results
are summarized in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2. The Result of the Logit Model 1 and 2
Dependent Variable: Japan's participation of DSM
Explanatroy Varibale
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

12.13746
(0.04740)

3.10547.
(0.059218)

1.41132
(0.33574)

-2.10116***
(0.000196)

-2.05996***
(0.000411)

-

-4.32388**
(0.00218)

-0.31928
(0.589214)

-1.39347**
(0.00305)

0.04687
(0.95495)

-

-

4. Whether Japan has made a
claim to a disputing party.
(DSM USE)

-0.30726
( 0.50588)

-

-

5. The number of Japan’s
claim to a disputing country
(NM DSM USE)

-0.10833
(0.24912)

-0.23432**
(0.002027)

-0.23844**
(0.00138)

6. Log GDP per capita of a
disputing country in t-1
(GDP PER)

-2.38342*
(0.01853 )

-1.15749*
(0.012542)

-0.73860.
(0.07600)

5.00196
(0.26407)

9.81048***
(0.000158)

10.51242***
(4.08e-05)

0.12468
(0.796605)

-

-

0.28779**
(0.00115)

0.31368***
(8.26e-08)

0.27028***
(8.40e-07)

10. The share of the disputing
country's total exports to
Japan in t-1
(EXP TO JP)

31.06082**
(0.00247)

-

-

11. The amount of ODA from
Japan to a disputing country
in t -1
(AID)

-0.92168*
(0.01320)

-

-

12.Velocity
(VELOCITY)

-4.85744**
( 0.00447)

-5.04456**
(0.001915)

-4.30484**
(0.00637)

Intercept

Category 1 : Political
Economic Costs

1. Whether Japan has a
regional trade agreement
with a disputing country
(RTA WITH)
2. Whether a dispute country
is South East Asia
(SEA)
3. Whether Japan became a
respondent claimed by a
disputing country
(TIT FOR TAT)

Category 2: Expected Benefits 7. Japan's exports sent to a
of Formal Participation
disputing country as a share
of Japan's total exports in t -1
(EXPORT)
8. Log GDP of a disputing
country in t-1
(GDP)
Category 3 : The likelihood of 9. The degree of democracy
Success in a Dispute
of a disputing country
(DEMO)

Category 4: Sector effects

Signif. Codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1
Model 1 ; AIC 303.24, N 286
Model 2; AIC 315.2, N 286
Model 3; AIC 326.78, N 286
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Results
Regarding the political economic variables in category 1, model 1 shows that
RTA WITH, SEA and GDP PER are statistically significant and negative. In models 2 and 3,
RTA WITH, NM DSM USE and GDP PER are statistically significant and negative. From the
results, we can see that Japan is a risk-averse country in using or joining a DSM when it
considers the political economy costs. Japan particularly tends to avoid using or joining a
DSM when it has an RTA with a disputing country. This finding is same as Bown’s finding
that political economy costs of international relations make it less likely that an exporter
will participate in a trade dispute when the respondent is politically important to the
exporter.155 More than half of Japan’s RTAs are with Southeast Asian countries and
others are countries in Asia Pacific region except Switzerland.156 These countries are
politically and economically important for Japan. Especially Japan and Southeast Asian
countries share common interest against the threat of emerging China. In model 3, I
replaced RTA WITH by SEA to see the effect of Southeast Asian countries. The result of
SEA is statistically significant and negative, similar to RTA WITH in model 2. Japan is less
likely to use or join a DSM with Southeast Asian countries, which shows Japan thinks
Southeast Asia is politically important. Japan’s behavior of using DSM reveals how the
region is import for Japan.
Japan is also less likely to use or join a DSM when Japan has used DSMs with a
disputing country. The more frequently Japan made claims to a disputing country, the
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Bown, C. P. (2005), supra note 108.
METI, EPA/FTA/Toshi kyotei (EPA/FTA/Investment Treaties), supra note 36.
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less likely Japan uses or joins a DSM to the country. The results of GDP PER show Japan is
less likely to use a DSM to developed countries same as the prediction. Japan seems to
prefer to use legally binding process to resolve disputes with developing countries.
Developing countries might more easily and unreasonably overturn the non-binding
agreement than developed countries or they may not sincerely negotiate the issue
without formal compulsory dispute settlement process. Indonesia, India, Philippines,
Egypt and China are five countries that have small GDP PER.
The control variables in categories 2 and 3 largely affirm the findings of previous
studies. Regarding category 2, in models 1, 2 and 3, as I expected, EXPORT is positive.
Disputes with highest amounts of Japan’s export sent to a disputing party as a share of
Japan’s total export are mainly related to disputes with the United States. The top five
values of EXPORT which are related to 35 disputes are disputes with the U.S. The
variable GDP does not fit to the model in the result of likelihood ratio test.
Regarding category 3 in model 1, all three variables are statistically significant.
DEMO and EXP TO JP are positive. AID is negative. In models 2 and 3, only DEMO is
statistically significant as the result of likelihood ratio test. DEMO is positive in the model
1, 2 and 3 as I expected. This result is same as our prediction and is in line with the idea
of liberalism. Countries with more than 9 score of democracy are Australia, Canada,
Chile, EU, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Mongolia, Poland, Taiwan, UK, and the U.S.
The result of EXP TO JP in model 1 is positive, which means Japan tends to join a
dispute with a country to which Japan has a retaliatory capacity as expected. The result
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of AID is negative which is different from expectation. Japan seems not to relate trade
disputes with foreign aid. Japan may think ODA is just a tool to make a good relation
with developing countries. The result may imply although Japan has a trade dispute with
a developing country, Japan does not threat the country by stopping or decreasing ODA
or may imply the amount of ODA cannot be used as a tool to retaliate to the disputing
country when a trade dispute happens.
The U.S. is strongly related to EXPORT and DEMO. India is strongly related to
GDP PER and EXP TO JP. These results are interesting. Japan is less likely to use or join a
DSM with higher GDP per capita country.
Regarding category 4, the results of VELOCITY are statistically significant and
negative in both models 1 and 2. These are same as the prediction and in line with Davis
and Shirato. Japanese high velocity industries such electronic industries are less likely to
use a DSM.
Figure 10 shows the marginal effects of model 2. Marginal effects of VELOCITY,
RTA WITH, SEA, NM DSM USE, EXPORT and DEMO do not cover 0. Marginal effects of
EXPORT and DEMO are positive and the marginal effect of others are negative. The
marginal effect of EXPORT is positively high and VELOCITY is negatively high. Figure 11
shows the marginal effects of model 3. In model 3, VELOCITY, SEA, NM DSM USE,
EXPORT and DEMO do not cover 0. Marginal effects of EXPORT and DEMO are positive
and the marginal effect of others are negative.
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Figure 10. Marginal Effect of Model 2
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Figure 11. Marginal Effect of Model 3

62

Summary and Arguments
From the analysis, there are seven important variables which are statistically fit
and affect Japan’s decision of joining a DSM: 1. RTA WITH (-), 2. SEA (-), 3. NM DSM USE
(-), 4. GDP PER (-), 5. EXPORT (+), 6. DEMO (+), and 7. VELOCITIES (-). I also found RTA
WITH can be replaced by SEA.
First, Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM with countries Japan has RTAs.
Having RTAs with countries means not only that Japan has economically binding rules
with these countries but also that Japan has politically good relationship with these
countries. If Japan does not trust a country, Japan cannot make agreements stipulating
higher level of rules with these countries. Unfortunately, disputes happen in reality
regardless of how they are close. Japan’s RTAs are not unexceptional. Japan has disputes
with some countries about Japan’s RTAs but Japan is reluctant to initiate or join a DSM
with these countries. Typical countries are ASEAN countries. In model 3, I replaced RTA
WITH by SEA and I found SEA also negatively affects Japan’s decision of using or joining a
DSM. That shows Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM with Southeast Asian countries,
which implies Japan does not want to worsen relation with these states by using a DSM
in trade agreements. Maintaining good relationship with Southeast Asian countries are
politically and diplomatically important considering the emerging influence of China in
the region. Using a DSM may not bring severe diplomatic conflicts between countries
but ideally there should not be any concern or dispute among countries. If the disputes
are resolved by negotiation without formal legal process, that appears to be desirable
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for Japan especially regarding disputes with Southeast Asian countries. Further research
will be needed to isolate the effects of signed trade agreements versus regional
geopolitical effects.
Second, Japan is less likely to initiate or join a DSM with countries with whom
Japan previously has used a DSM. The more Japan has used DSMs with a country, the
less Japan initiates or joins a DSM with the country. Japan seems not to want to use or
join a DSM with same countries again. It seems that Japan does not want to worsen the
relationship with countries by using DSMs many times.
Third, Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM with countries when their GDP per
capita is high. Countries with high GDP per capita are developed countries. Japan may
think it can be able to resolve disputes with developed countries without using DSMs.
Developed countries would be more reasonably negotiable to resolve issues. On the
other hand, negotiation with developing counties would be harder. Japan may think it
needs to resort to formal dispute settlement process to resolve disputes when disputes
are related to developing countries.
Forth, EXPORT has positive effect for Japan to join a DSM. Japan is more likely to
join a DSM with a country Japan exports a lot. The typical countries are the U.S. and
China.
Fifth, Japan is more likely to use or join a DSM with countries which have high
degree of democracy. Not only developed countries but also some developing countries
have higher score of democracy. In my data, countries that have more than 8 score of
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democracy are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Mongolia, Philippines, Poland, Taiwan, Turkey,
UK and the U.S. Considering the result of GDP PER and DEMO, Japan seems to be more
likely to use or join a DSM with countries that are democratic and developing countries
with expectation that these countries will follow the adjudication of a panel or
arbitration.
Finally, Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM regarding high velocities
industries. This result is consistent with Davis and Shirato.157
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Davis, C. L., & Shirato, Y. (2007), supra note 51.
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CHAPTER 4
APPLICATION
This chapter introduces past WTO cases where Japan was a complainant or a
third party and examines whether Japan could use a RTA DSM to these cases. After that,
I explain how some important explanatory variables affect Japan’ decision of using a
DSM.
Past WTO Cases
Reviewing Japan’s past 21 WTO cases in Table 4.1, there is no case where Japan
had the option to use a RTA DSM. While there are 2 cases against Indonesia, these cases
happened before the JIEPA entered into effect. For cases where Japan was a third party,
Table 4.2 shows that there are 9 instances where Japanese RTA DSMs could have been
used. Japan seemed to have joined cases related to agriculture, horticulture and animal
from the point of defense for future disputes. A country does not make a claim from the
point of defense. Japan seems to have offensive interests in iron and steel industry. From
the point of offense, DS456 India Electric and Electronic, DS490 and DS496 Indonesia
Iron and steel cases seem to be related to Japanese interests.
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Table 4.1. Japan is a Complainant
1
2

3

4

5
6

7

8

9

10

11
12

13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

DS No. RespondentSector
6 US
Automoble
51 Brazil
Automobile

Rule
DSU, GATT
GATT, Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures,
TRIMS
55 Indonesia Automobile
GATT, Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures,
TRIMS
64 Indonesia Automobile
GATT, Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures,
TRIMS
95 US
Government Procurement GP
139 Canada Automobile
GATS, GATT, Subsidies
and Countervailing
Measures, TRIMs
162 US
Iron and steel
Anti-dumping, GATT,
Agreement Establishing
the WTO
184 US
Iron and steel
Anti-dumping, GATT,
Agreement Establishing
the WTO
217 US
Iron and steel, machine Anti-dumping, GATT,
parts, bearings, aircraft Subsidies and
equipments, forklifts,
Countervailing Measures,
printing machine, belts Agreement Establishing
for manufacturing
the WTO
244 US
Iron and steel
Anti-dumping, GATT,
Agreement Establishing
the WTO
249 US
Iron and steel
GATT, Safeguards
322 US
Iron and steel
Anti-dumping, GATT,
Agreement Establishing
the WTO
376 EU
IT products
GATT
412 Canada Renewable energy
GATT, Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures,
TRIMS
433 China
Rare earths
GATT, Protocol of
Accession
445 Argentina Import restriction on
GATT, TRIMS, Import
broad industry
Licensing, Safeguards
454 China
Iron and steel
Anti-dumping, GATT
463 Russia
Automobile
GATT, TRIMS, TBT
468 Ukline
Automobile
Safeguards, GATT
495 Korea
Food
GATT, SPS
497 Brazil
Automotive sector, the GATT, TRIMS, Subsidies
electronics and
and Countervailing
technology industry
Measures
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Status
Mutually agreed
Consultation suspended.

won

won

Panel dissolved
won

won

won

won

lost

won
won

won
won

won
won
Be in progrss
Consultation suspended.
Be in progrss
Be in progrss
Be in progrss

Table 4.2. Japan is a Third Party
DS
Complain Year Respondent Sector
No. ant
341 EC
2006 Mexico
Agriculture

1
2

430 US
455 US

2012 India
2013 Indonesia

Agriculture
Horticulture and
animal products

456 US

2013 India

Electric and
Electronic

477 NZ

2014 Indonesia

Horticulture and
animal products

478 US

2014 Indonesia

Horticulture and
animal products

484 Brazil

2014 Indonesia

Food

490 Tiaipei

2015 Indonesia

Iron and steel

496 Vietnam

2015 Indonesia

Iron and steel

3

4

5

6

7
8
9
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Rule

Status

Agriculture,
GATT,
Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measures
SPS, GATT
GATT,
Agriculture,
Import
Licensing
GATT, TRIMS,
Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measures
GATT,
Agriculture,
Import
Licensing,
Preshipment
Inspection
GATT,
Agriculture,
Import
Licensing,
Preshipment
Inspection
SPS, TBT,
Agriculture,
Import
Licensing,
Preshipment
Inspection,
GATT
GATT,
Safeguards
GATT,
Safeguards

won

won
Panel
established, but
not yet
composed
Panel composed

Panel composed

Panel
established, but
not yet
composed

Panel
established, but
not yet
composed

Panel composed
Panel composed

Table 4.3. Potential Disputes

Country
1 Indonesia
2 Indonesia
3 Indonesia

4 Indonesia
5 Indonesia
6
7
8
9

Malaysia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Philippines

10 India

Non-use of the WTO DSM and RTA DSMs
Export Restrictions on Mineral Resources and Local Content Issue.
Local Content Requirement on Retails Services
Quantitative Import Restrictions
Import Restrictions (compulsory registration by the importers of
pharmaceutical products, foods, beverages, footwear, electrical
equipment, children’s toys, steel products, etc.)
Suspension of infringing goods at borders
Imposition on Internal Taxes on Automobiles and Import
Restrictions on Automobiles based on the Approved Permit system
Excise Tax Exemption System on Domestic Automobile Parts
Export Restrictions on Logs
Export Restrictions on unprocessed minerals
Local content requirements (domestic-product preferential
subsidies) on domestically manufactured electronic products
Non-use of RTA DSMs

1 Indonesia
2 Thailand
3 Thailand
4 Indonesia

Execution of the JIEPA Intellectual Property Chapter
Violations of the schedule of elimination of tariffs in the JapanThailand EPA
Unclear implementation of the rule of local procurement parts in
the JTEPA
Violation of automobile tariff of the JIEPA
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Application to Japan’s Disputes
Figure 12 shows the correlation between the probability of Japan’s use of a
DSM and the ratio of Japan’s export to a disputing country. The line of sample mean is
the average score of each variable. As seen in Figure 12, the probability increases with
the increase of export. The line goes down when a dispute is related to SEA or RTA,
which means that when a disputing country is a Southeast Asian country or Japan’s RTA
country, Japan’s possibility of using a DSM follows lower lines. The percentage of Japan’s
export to each Southeast Asian country is less than 0.1. In Figure 12, the width of
dropping line is huge in the area below the 0.3. Southeast Asian countries are located in
the lower left corner of lower lines. Japan’s possibility to use a DSM to these countries
are around 0.2 when the other variables are average. On the other hand, the line goes
up when Japan does not have a RTA with a disputing country such as the U.S. Japan’s
export to the U.S. is around 0.3. When the other variables are average, Japan’s
probability of using or joining a DSM to the U.S. is around 0.9.
According to Figure 12, when the share of Japan’s export to a disputing country
is more than 0.4, the possibility of Japan’s using or joining a DSM is almost 1, which
means when the share of export to the disputing country is more than 40%, Japan will
use a DSM regardless of political concerns. In the original data, there is no country to
which the share is more than 20%, but the results indicate that as export dependence
increases so too does Japan’s willingness to litigate. If export dependence reaches
numbers as high as 40%, we can predict that Japan will be far less hesitant to use a DSM
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than is now observed. Under the current situation, Japan’s use or joining of a DSM is
determined by the balance of all other factors, such as whether a country is in Southeast
Asia or sector-level variables.
Figure 13 shows the correlation between the probability of Japan’s use of a
DSM and VELOCITY. The probability decreases with the increase of VELOCITY. Same as
Figure 12, RTA and SEA down the slope. For example Southeast Asian countries are
follow the lower slope and the U.S. follows the higher slope in Figure 13. The velocity of
automobile is around 0.178. Japan’s probability to use or join a DSM to Southeast Asia is
around 0.2 to 0.3 while to the U.S. is around 0.7 to 0.8 in Figure 13.
Different from exports, although velocity is 0, the probability of Japan’s use or
joining a DSM is less than 0.8, which means Japan may not use or join a DSM despite a
disputing industry having low velocity. This result implies that Japan does not decide to
use or join a DSM only by a request by an industry; if so, then we would expect a
probably approaching 1 of DSM use when velocity is low. Although low-velocity
industries do want the Japanese government use or join a DSM, the Japanese
government considers the other factors such as political relations. For example, in Figure
3, if a disputing country is a Southeast Asian country, Japan is less likely to use or join a
DSM although the relevant industries have low velocity.
A brief discussion of the case of Indonesian automobile tariff violations is
illuminating. Indonesia is a Southeast Asian and its violation of Japan’s RTA is related to
relatively high velocity automobile industry. Japan has RTA with Indonesia. These
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elements negatively affect the likelihood of using less DSMs generally in the statistical
model, and help us understand why the Japanese government has not taken action
despite the clear economic losses from the high tariff levels. According to the METI and
JMC reports, there are at least 14 cases which may violate rules of either the WTO or
Japan’s RTAs. 10 cases might violate rules of both of the WTO and RTAs. Table 4.3 shows
4 potential cases with Japan’s RTAs and all of 4 cases are related to Southeast Asian
countries. On the other hand, among 21 Japan’s claimant’s cases in the WTO in Table 4.1,
just two are from Southeast Asia, and are with Indonesia but 8 cases are with the U.S.
These are in line with the probability analysis of Japan’s using or joining a DSM in Figure
12 and 13. Figure 4.1 shows Japan started to use a DSM against China recently. That
reflect the increase of Japan’s export to China, which affects the Japan’s probability to
use or joining a DSM.
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Figure 12. Export Dependence and DSM Use
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Figure 13. Sector Velocity and DSM Use
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
When a country decides whether it should use a DSM, it considers the costs
and benefits. Two sets of costs are considerable: litigation costs such as hiring lawyers
and payment for arbitrators and the political economy costs. Benefits are related to the
damage brought by a disputing country’s measure violating the international trade rules.
When costs of using the DSM are higher than the benefits, a country will not pursue
litigation. The analysis in Chapter 3 shows that the following seven variables affect
Japan’s decision of joining a DSM: RTA WITH (-), SEA (-), NM DSM USE (-), GDP PER (-),
EXPORT (+), DEMO (+), and VELOCITY (-). Among them, I need to pay attention to
variables that negatively affect Japan’s decision of using or joining a DSM. Variables RTA
WITH, SEA, NM DSM USE, GDP PER and VELOCITIY negatively affect Japan decision of
joining a DSM. Especially, RTA WITH, SEA, NM DSM USE and GEP PER are related to
political economic cost and are related to Japan’s concern for worsening relationship
with disputing countries.
For example, in the dispute of “Indonesia, Export Restrictions on Mineral
Resources and Local Content Issue”, since the Indonesian Parliament passed the Mining
Law in December 2008, Japanese government has expressed its concerns to the
Indonesian government at least 16 times in many occasions.158 Japan expressed their
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METI, 2014 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements - WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA -,
Part I Problems of Trade Policies and Measures in Individual Countries and Regions, Chapter 2 ASEAN. Available:
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/2014WTO/01_02.pdf.
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concerns to Indonesia in December 2009, February, June, September, October, and
November 2011, February, June, August and October 2012, September, October and
December 2013, March 2014 and May and June 2015. In this dispute, Japan has pursued
negotiation to resolve the issue instead of using a DSM more than 7 years. 159 As seen in
this case, Japan has avoided using the DSM. In this case, Japan seems to hesitate to use
a DSM. Negotiating a same issue more than 7 years is too long. If Japan used a DSM, the
issue would have been solved earlier than 7 years. Japan seems to avoid using a DSM
caring relationship with Indonesia.
Ideally using a DSM should not affect the relation of countries. In order to
improve Japan’s non participation in a DSM because of fearing worsening diplomatic
relations especially with Southeast Asian countries, there needs some systems which
ensure using a DSM does not decrease political economic relations with a disputing
country. If Japan thinks using a DSM does not worsen the relations with a disputing
country, Japan will join a dispute settlement procedure more. Otherwise, Japan will
continue to pursue unofficial negotiation to resolve the dispute rather than joining an
official dispute settlement process. This is similar to the idea of herd behavior. Of course,
when other variables which positively affect Japan’s decision of using or joining a DSM
are very high, Japan joins a DSM. When EXPORT is very high and VELOVITY is low, Japan
will use a DSM. However, that means Japan allows countries to violate trade agreements
in some conditions. In order to ensure fair business environment, this situation should

159
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be avoided. Regarding this Japan’s RTA problems, Davey made interesting comments
about the retaliation in case of non-compliance of the WTO DSM decisions.160 Davey
explained probably only the most powerful members like the U.S. and the EU can use
retaliatory action as the ultimate sanction under the WTO rules. It appears that informal
pressures to comply are much greater in the WTO than the RTA.
Considering the result of the analysis and Davey, multilateral international DSM
including powerful members such as the U.S. and EU would be a solution to improve
Japan’s use of RTA DSMs. Although a country violates the rules of multilateral trade
agreements, not only Japan but also other countries may try to resolve the problem.
Japan does not have to be fear of worsening relation with the disputing country. In the
past, Japan was fearful of using a DSM with China and Korea but Japan has started to use
the WTO DSMs with both countries.161 The violation of rules of a disputing country is
less likely to become bilateral problems in multilateral DSMs. Joint action seems suitable
way for Japan in using a DSM in trade agreements. I suggest a DSM of multilateral trade
agreement would mitigate Japan’s concerns of using a DSM in trade agreements.
All of Japan’s RTAs which have come into effect are bilateral. Therefore Japan
cannot collaborate with other countries to make a claim to a disputing country in Japan’s
current RTAs, which means these disputes inevitably become bilateral issues between
Japan and the disputing country. Therefore within the institutional structure of Japan’s
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current RTAs, political economic costs largely affect Japan’s decision making. If the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is ratified in the future, these dynamics have the
potential to change. The TPP consists of 12 countries and includes 4 Southeast Asian
countries: Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam.162 After the TPP is implemented,
Japan can collaborate with other TPP members to use a DSM, for example, when Japan
faces disputes with a Southeast Asian TPP member, which will mitigate the Japan’s
concerns of worsening a relation with the disputing country. Multilateral DSMs will
dilute the tension between two countries brought by disputes in trade agreements, and
Japan will be able to avoid bilateral disputes in multilateral trade agreements.
Using a DSM can constitute a real diplomatic cost. Once formal litigation occurs
between 2 countries, it becomes a diplomatic issue subject to domestic political
pressures and media attention. However, it the disputes are not bilateral but multilateral,
the situation will be different: the respondent country cannot effectively retaliate
against many claimants and the dispute does not become bilateral diplomatic problems.
In the future, there is some room to expand my research. For example, I found
the velocity of industry as an important explanatory variable for Japan’s use of a DSM
but the business strategy of each company in an industry may be different. Although A
company and B company are in same industry, their supply chains may be different. The
difference of business of a company may prefer different position to use a DSM. Japan’s
decision not to litigate in an automobile tariff dispute with Indonesia might have less to
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do with the velocity of the auto sector and more to do with firms’ dependence on
suppliers or component manufacturers in Indonesia and not wanting to disturb that
status quo. If positions of a use of DSM among countries in an industry are different, the
industry cannot ask their government to use a DSM. Further research can explore
industry effects more as well as the effects of global supply integration.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Tables of Japan-Indonesia EPA Automobile Tariff Rates
The JIEPA came into effect in July 2008. In the JIEPA, the import tariffs to
automobile classified as HS 8703.23 in the Schedule of Indonesia are as follows.
Table A.1. Schedule of Indonesia of the JIEPA163

163

MOFA, the JIEPA Annex 1 referred to in Chapter 2 Schedules in relation to Article 20. Available:
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/epa0708/annex1.pdf.
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(Customs duties on originating goods classified under the tariff lines indicated with “P” shall be as provided for in the
terms and conditions set out in the note indicated in Column 5 in each Party’s Schedule. )

Notes 13 and 14 in the schedule above mean as follows;
Part 3 Section 1 Notes for Schedule of Indonesia in the JIEPA Annex 1164
13. The rate of customs duty shall be reduced in accordance with the following:
(a) 60.0 percent, as from the date of entry into force of this Agreement;
(b) 20.0 percent, as from January 1, 2012; and
(c) 5.0 percent or the rate of customs duty applied by Indonesia at the time of
importation under the AKFTA, whichever is the less, as from January 1, 2016.
14. The rate of customs duty shall be reduced in accordance with the following:
(a) 45.0 percent, as from the date of entry into force of this Agreement;
(b) 20.0 percent, as from January 1, 2012; and
(c) 5.0 percent or the rate of customs duty applied by Indonesia at the time of
importation under the AKFTA, whichever is the less, as from January 1, 2016.

164

Ibid.
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Table A.2. Appendix of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of
Indonesia (No.209/PMK.011/2012) on Import Duty Tariff Setting in the JIEPA165

165

Appendix of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia (No.209/PMK.011/2012) on
Import duty Tariff setting of the JIEPA.
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Table A.3. Appendix of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of
Indonesia (No. 95/PMK.011/2008) on Import Duty Tariff Setting in the JIEPA166

166

Appendix of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia (No. 95/PMK.011/2008) on
Import duty Tariff setting of the JIEPA.
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As seen in Table A.1, the tariff rate to Complete Build-up (CBU) motor cars whose
cylinders are exceeding 1500cc and less than 3000cc are categorized as P13 or P14. Both
P13 and P14 mean import tariff rates are supposed be 20.0 percent from January 1,
2012 and 5.0 percent from January 1, 2016. However as seen in Table A.2 and A.3, the
import tariff rates to automobiles other than Sedan and station wagons are higher than
the rates of JIEPA. According to Table A.2 and A.3, Indonesia levied 30.9% of import tariff
in 2012, 28.1% in 2013, 25.3% in 2014, 22.5% in 2015, 19.7% in 2016, 16.9% in 2017, and
14.1% in 2018.
Appendix B. The Rules of Japan’s RTAs
The followings are the brief explanations of rules in Japan’s RTAs. 167
1. General Provisions
The Chapter of General Provisions sets the general rules of the agreement such
as the objectives, definitions of terms, administrative procedures, treatment of
confidential information, exceptions, and joint committee.
2. Trade in Goods
The chapter of Trade in Goods stipulates the rules of trade in goods such as the
national treatment, elimination of customs duties, export subsidies, and safeguard
measures. The way of eliminating tariff is determined by the tariff elimination period,
the tariff rate, and the tariff elimination formula. These elements are stipulated in the
tariff schedule as an annex.

167

METI, supra note 38.
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3. Rules of Origin
The chapter of Rule of Origins specifies the rules of nationality of internationally
traded goods. They can be generally classified into preferential sectors and
non-preferential sectors. Rules of origin are comprised of (i) rules of origin and (ii) origin
certification procedures.
4. Customs Procedures
The chapter of Customs Procedures have rules about customs procedures such
as the transparency, the information exchange, and the sub-committee.
5. Investment
The champed of Investment stipulates the rules of investment such as the
national treatment, most-favored nation, fair and equitable treatment, prohibition of
performance requirements, expropriation and compensation, and investor-state dispute
settlement.
6. Trade in Services
The chapter of the Trade in Services stipulates the rules of trade in services such
as the national treatment, most-favored nation, and market access.
7. Movement of Natural Persons
The chapter of the movement of natural persons has the rules of movement of
natural persons between parties. Japan has made horizontal commitments only in three
areas: intra-corporate transferees, professional services and temporary stays. The
commitment on movement of natural persons is restricted to as intra-corporate
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transferees and professional engineers. Unskilled workers are not covered by
commitments due to labor market concerns of every country including Japan. It is
extremely unlikely that an EPA/FTA would include a provision that would lead to a large
number of unskilled workers coming into the country.
8. Energy and Mineral Resources
The chapter of Energy and Mineral Resources has rules to make stable trade of
energy and natural resources such as the notification and consultation when adopting
export restricting measures. Japan has this chapter only in EPAs with Brunei, Indonesia,
and Australia.
9. Intellectual Property
The chapter of Intellectual Property has rules about protection of intellectual
property such as the simplifying procedures and enhancing the transparency of
procedures, strengthening the protection of intellectual property rights, and
strengthening enforcement.
10. Government Procurement
The chapter of Government Procurement sets the rules of government
procurement such as the national treatment, non-discrimination, fair and equitable
procurement procedures, complaint filing systems, delisting of privatized entities, and
offsets.
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11. Competition
The chapter of Competition has rules of competition such restricting
anti-competitive practices; and establishing common understanding and cooperative
framework between Parties.
12 Improvement of Business Environment
The chapter on the Improvement on the Business Environment provides for
establishing a “business environment improvement subcommittee”, which is a
discussion mechanism between the governments. If both parties agree, the
representatives of companies can join the committee.
13. Cooperation
The chapter of Cooperation provides for the framework of technical assistance
from Japan to developing countries in many fields.
14. Dispute Settlement
The chapter of Dispute Settlement sets procedures for dispute settlement
between Parties such as the consultations, establishment of arbitral tribunals, and
implementation of award.
15. Electronic Commerce
The chapter of Electronic Commerce has rules of electronic commerce such as
the definition of electronic commerce, the classification of digital contents, and no
imposing customs duties.
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16. TBT and SPS
Some Japanese RTAs have rules of TBT and SPS to decrease trade barriers
relating to measures of standards and conformity assessment systems.
17. Final Provisions
The chapter of Final Provisions sets the rules of amendment, the entry into
force and the termination of the agreement.
18. Labor and Environment
Japan has not had independent chapter of Labor or Environment in its RTAs
except TPP agreement. This chapter provides for the obligation to make an effort not to
decrease the protection level of labor or environment to increase trade and investment.
The Procedure of a Dispute settlement
In the WTO and Japan’s RTAs, a formal dispute settlement procedure starts by
requesting a consultation. In the WTO, Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, Understanding
on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes (WTO DSU) provides for
the procedure of a dispute settlement.168 For example, when Japan requests a
consultation to a disputing country, the country must start a consultation within 30 days
in the WTO DSM.169 If the consultation fails to settle a dispute within 60 days, Japan can
request the establishment of a panel.170 A panel is established unless Dispute

168
169
170

WTO, DSU. Available: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm.
WTO DSU, art. 4 (3).
WTO DSU art. 4(7).
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Settlement Body (hereinafter DSB) decides by consensus not to establish a panel.171 The
panel is composed of three panelists and the Secretariat of the WTO proposes
nominations for the panel.172 In the WTO DSM, any member having a substantial
interest in a matter of panel, can make written submissions to the panel as a third party.
The submission is reflected in the panel report.173 When the parties to the panel have
failed to develop a mutually satisfactory solution, the panel submits a report to the DSB.
The report includes the findings of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions and the
basic rationale behind its findings.174 The period of the panel is within 6 months.175
Within 60 days after the circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report is
adopted at a DSB meeting unless a disputing party notifies the DSB to appeal or the DSB
decides by consensus not to adopt the report.176 When Japan appeals a panel report,
the Appellate Body hear the appeal. The Appellate Body is composed of 7 persons. 177
The proceeding of the Appellate Body is within 60 days. 178 An appeal is limited to issues
of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel. 179
An appellate Body report is adopted by the DSB unless the DSB decides by consensus
not to adopt the Appellate Body report. When a panel or the Appellate Body concludes
that a measure is inconsistent with a rules of the WTO, it recommends that the Member

171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

WTO DSU, art. 6(1).
WTO DSU, art. 8(5) and (6).
WTO DSU, art. 10 (2)
WTO DSU, art. 12(7).
WTO DS art. 12(8).
WTO DSU art. 16(4)
WTO DSU art. 17(1)
WTO DSU art. 17(5).
WTO DSU art. 17(6).
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bring the measure into conformity with the rules.180 Compensation and the suspension
of concession or other obligations are available as temporary measures if the
recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of
time.181
For another example, in the case of the JIEPA DSM, when Japan requests a
consultation to Indonesia, Indonesia must start the consultation within 60 days.182
Japan can request the establishment of an arbitral tribunal to Indonesia if Indonesia
does not start the consultation within 60 days after the receipt of the request or if the
Parties fail to resolve the dispute through the consultations within 90 days.183 The
arbitral tribunal comprises three arbitrators.184 Each Party, within 45 days after the
receipt of the request for the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, appoints one
arbitrator and proposes candidates to serve as the third arbitrator who is the chair of
the arbitral tribunal.185 The Parties agree on and appoint the third arbitrator within 60
days after the receipt of the request for the establishment of an arbitral tribunal. 186 The
arbitral tribunal, within 90 days after the date of its establishment, submits to the
Parties its draft award including both the descriptive part, and its findings and
conclusions. A Party may submit comments in writing to the arbitral tribunal on the draft

180
181
182
183
184
185
186

WTO DSU art. 19(1).
WTO DSU art. 22(1).
JIEPA art. 141(2).
JIEPA art. 142(1).
JIEPA art. 142(3).
JIEPA art. 142(4).
JIEPA art 142(5).

94

award within 15 days after the date of submission of the draft award.187 The arbitral
tribunal issues its award, within 30 days after the date of submission of the draft
award.188 The award of the arbitral tribunal is final and binding on the Parties.189
Compensation and the suspension of concession or other obligations are available when
the award is not implemented and the arbitral tribunal confirms it. 190

187
188
189
190

JIEPA art. 144(7).
JIEPA art. 144(8).
JIEPA art. 144(10).
JIEPA art. 146.
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